---
title: "Intuit Inc. (NASDAQ: INTU): A Comprehensive Intrinsic Value Analysis"
author: "DeepValues Research"
publisher: "DeepValues Research (DeepValues / LuLu Ventures LLC)"
type: "Research article"
ticker: "INTU"
company: "Intuit"
sector: "Technology"
industry: "Software - Application"
wikidata: "https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q1318848"
wikipedia: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuit"
date: "2026-01-06"
language: "en"
section: "Company Research"
answer: "DeepValues Research published “Intuit Inc. (NASDAQ: INTU): A Comprehensive Intrinsic Value Analysis” on Intuit (INTU) on Jan 6, 2026. Intuit Inc. represents one of the most enduring success stories in the software technology sector, having successfully navigated multiple platform paradigms—from DOS to Windows, desktop to cloud, and now, aggressively transitioning into an AI-driven expert platform."
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markdown_url: "https://research.deepvalues.ai/company/intu/intuit-buffett-style-valuation-analysis/index.md"
license: "CC BY 4.0"
license_url: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
cite_as: "DeepValues Research, Intuit Inc. (NASDAQ: INTU): A Comprehensive Intrinsic Value Analysis, https://research.deepvalues.ai/company/intu/intuit-buffett-style-valuation-analysis/"
publisher_url: "https://deepvalues.ai"
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data_note: "Reports are dated snapshots. Current data via the DeepValues API: https://app.deepvalues.ai/developers"
disclaimer: "Educational research, not investment advice."
---
# **Intuit Inc. (NASDAQ: INTU): A Comprehensive Intrinsic Value Analysis**

## **1\. Executive Summary**

Intuit Inc. represents one of the most enduring success stories in the software technology sector, having successfully navigated multiple platform paradigms—from DOS to Windows, desktop to cloud, and now, aggressively transitioning into an AI-driven expert platform. This report executes a rigorous intrinsic value analysis of Intuit, strictly adhering to a Warren Buffett-style investment philosophy. This framework necessitates a disciplined evaluation starting with the qualitative durability of the business model and its "moat," followed by a forensic examination of financial metrics to verify economic characteristics, and concluding with a valuation assessment that demands a substantial margin of safety.  
As of the fiscal year ended July 31, 2025, Intuit reported total revenue of $18.8 billion, a 16% increase year-over-year, with GAAP operating income growing 36% to $4.9 billion.1 The company sits at the intersection of critical financial workflows for consumers and small businesses, commanding a market capitalization of approximately $184 billion.2 The core investment thesis rests on the company’s ability to leverage high switching costs in its small business segment and brand trust in its consumer tax segment to generate high returns on invested capital (ROIC).  
However, a Buffett-oriented analysis reveals fissures in the "compounder" narrative. While the business quality is undeniable, characterized by robust pricing power and recurring revenue, the valuation appears to price in flawless execution while discounting significant regulatory risks—specifically the expansion of the IRS Direct File program.3 Furthermore, the company’s capital allocation strategy, particularly the divergence in returns between the Credit Karma and Mailchimp acquisitions, warrants scrutiny regarding management’s discipline in deploying shareholder capital. With the stock trading at a premium multiple of roughly 34x GAAP earnings, the requisite margin of safety for a prudent value investor is currently absent. This report argues that while Intuit is a "wonderful business," it is not currently trading at a "fair price," creating a precarious setup for long-term investors seeking capital preservation alongside growth.

## ---

**2\. Business Quality and Competitive Positioning: The Moat**

Warren Buffett seeks businesses with "economic moats"—durable competitive advantages that protect high returns on capital from competitors over long periods. Intuit’s moat is formidable but bifurcated: it is comprised of an exceptionally wide, deep moat in its Global Business Solutions (SMB) segment and a historically strong but eroding moat in its Consumer (Tax) segment.

### **2.1 Global Business Solutions: The Power of Switching Costs**

The Global Business Solutions (GBS) segment, anchored by QuickBooks, is the economic engine of Intuit, generating $11.1 billion in revenue in FY2025, up 16% year-over-year.1 The competitive advantage here is structural and rooted in **high switching costs** and **data gravity**.  
The Accounting Operating System  
QuickBooks is not merely software; it is the operating system for millions of small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs). Once a business integrates its bank feeds, vendor lists, payroll data, and historical transaction logs into QuickBooks Online (QBO), the friction required to switch to a competitor like Xero or Oracle NetSuite becomes prohibitively high. This is not just a matter of data migration, which itself is complex and prone to errors; it is a disruption of business continuity. An SMB owner, whose primary focus is survival and growth, rarely views the marginal cost savings of a cheaper accounting platform as worth the operational risk of a failed migration or a disrupted tax filing season.  
This "lock-in" is evidenced by Intuit’s extraordinary pricing power. Between 2020 and 2025, Intuit systematically raised subscription prices across its QuickBooks Online tiers without stalling growth. For instance, the price of the "Plus" plan increased from $70 per month in 2020 to $115 per month in 2025, a cumulative increase of approximately 64%.4 Despite these aggressive price actions, QBO accounting revenue grew 22% in FY2025, driven by both customer growth and mix shift.5 This ability to raise prices significantly above the rate of inflation without losing customers is the hallmark of a wide economic moat.  
The Accountant Channel as a Defensive Bulwark  
Intuit has successfully co-opted the primary influencers in the SMB software decision chain: accountants. Through its ProTax segment (Lacerte, ProSeries, ProConnect), Intuit dominates the professional tax software market. Accountants who use Intuit products for their practice are overwhelmingly likely to recommend QuickBooks to their clients to ensure seamless data interoperability. This creates a powerful network effect where the professional ecosystem reinforces the dominance of the SMB platform. The friction for an SMB to switch away from QuickBooks is compounded if their external accountant refuses to support a different general ledger system.

### **2.2 Consumer Group: Brand Trust Under Siege**

The Consumer Group, primarily TurboTax, generated $4.9 billion in revenue in FY2025.1 Historically, this segment enjoyed a wide moat based on **brand trust** and **regulatory complexity**. For decades, the complexity of the U.S. tax code served as Intuit’s greatest asset, driving terrified taxpayers toward the "maximum refund guaranteed" promise of TurboTax.  
The Erosion of the Regulatory Moat  
This moat is currently facing its most significant existential threat in the company's history: the IRS Direct File program. Funded by the Inflation Reduction Act, the IRS launched a pilot allowing taxpayers to file directly with the government for free. In the 2025 filing season, this program expanded significantly to 24 states, covering approximately 62% of the U.S. population and making over 30 million taxpayers eligible.3  
Unlike previous "Free File" alliance programs, which were private-sector partnerships often hidden from consumers (a practice for which Intuit faced legal action and settlements), Direct File is a public-sector competitor with zero marginal cost to the consumer. While Intuit argues that Direct File only serves simple returns, the strategic threat is the "slippery slope." As the IRS iterates on the product, supporting more forms and increasing usability, the definition of a "simple" return expands. This threatens the top of Intuit’s funnel. Roughly 30-40% of tax filers have simple tax situations. If the IRS captures this volume, Intuit loses the opportunity to acquire young customers early in their financial lives and monetize them as their complexity grows (e.g., buying a house, starting a gig business).  
Strategic Response: The "Assisted" Pivot  
Intuit’s management, anticipating this erosion, has aggressively pivoted toward the "Assisted" category with TurboTax Live. By connecting filers with human tax experts via video, Intuit offers a value proposition—audit defense, expert advice, and peace of mind—that the IRS cannot legally or operationally match. The data validates this strategy: in FY2025, TurboTax Live revenue grew 47%, now representing 41% of total Consumer Group revenue.1 Simultaneously, total TurboTax units declined by 2% as the company deliberately "yielded share" among lower-value customers to focus on high-ARPU filers.1 This confirms that Intuit is retreating to the higher ground of its moat, where complexity ensures pricing power, but it also signals that the era of easy volume growth in the tax segment is over.

### **2.3 The "One Intuit" Ecosystem and Network Effects**

A crucial aspect of Intuit's strategy is the integration of its various platforms to create a unified data ecosystem. The acquisition of Credit Karma for $7.1 billion in 2020 was a move to capture the consumer side of the balance sheet. With over 100 million members, Credit Karma provides Intuit with high-frequency engagement data (credit score checks) that TurboTax (annual engagement) lacks.  
This creates a **data network effect**. Intuit can see an SMB’s cash flow via QuickBooks and its owner’s personal credit situation via Credit Karma. This proprietary view allows for superior underwriting of capital and personalized financial product recommendations. In FY2025, Credit Karma revenue grew 32% to $2.3 billion, driven by strength in personal loans and credit cards.1 The ability to cross-pollinate data—using tax returns to verify income for loans, or using credit data to pre-fill tax forms—strengthens the ecosystem's lock-in.

### **2.4 Management and Capital Allocation**

Buffett places immense weight on the quality and integrity of management. CEO Sasan Goodarzi has led the company since 2019, overseeing a period of rapid transformation.  
Capital Allocation Track Record  
Intuit’s capital allocation has been aggressive, characterized by large-scale M\&A.

* **Credit Karma ($7.1B):** This acquisition appears to be a success. It has integrated well, solidified the consumer data strategy, and is generating strong double-digit growth.1  
* **Mailchimp ($12B):** The verdict on this 2021 acquisition is less favorable. Strategic friction remains evident. While the logic of combining marketing (front office) with accounting (back office) is sound, growth has lagged. In Q1 FY2026, the Online Ecosystem grew 25% *excluding* Mailchimp, but only 21% with it.6 This implies Mailchimp is growing significantly slower than the core business, acting as a drag on topline velocity. Paying $12 billion for an asset that decelerates the overall ecosystem raises questions about capital discipline and the potential for future goodwill impairments.

Shareholder Returns  
Intuit returns capital through dividends and buybacks. In FY2025, the company repurchased $2.8 billion of stock.1 However, a closer look at the cash flow statement reveals that Stock-Based Compensation (SBC) expense was $1.97 billion in the same period.1 Thus, roughly 70% of the capital deployed for buybacks merely offset the dilution from employee compensation rather than reducing the share count. The diluted share count remained relatively flat, decreasing marginally from 284 million in 2024 to 283 million in 2025.8 This "treadmill" dynamic reduces the effectiveness of buybacks as a value-accretive tool for shareholders.

## ---

**3\. Financial Analysis: Metrics and Durability**

Quantitative validation is required to confirm the qualitative assessment of the business. Intuit’s financials reflect a high-margin, cash-generative software business with strong pricing power.

### **3.1 Profitability and Margins**

Intuit boasts exceptional gross margins, hovering around 80% 2, reflecting the low marginal cost of software delivery. However, operating margins require careful dissection due to the heavy use of SBC.  
**Table 1: Operating Margin Analysis (FY2025 vs. FY2024)**

| Metric | FY2025 ($ Millions) | Margin % | FY2024 ($ Millions) | Margin % | Growth YoY |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Total Revenue** | $18,831 | 100% | $16,285 | 100% | 16% |
| **GAAP Operating Income** | $4,923 | 26.1% | $3,630 | 22.3% | 36% |
| **Non-GAAP Operating Income** | $7,572 | 40.2% | $6,402 | 39.3% | 18% |
| **Stock-Based Compensation** | $1,968 | 10.5% | $1,940 | 11.9% | 1.4% |

Analysis:  
The divergence between GAAP and Non-GAAP operating income is substantial ($2.65 billion difference in FY2025), primarily driven by $1.97 billion in SBC and amortization of acquired intangible assets. Buffett famously regards SBC as a real expense, as it dilutes shareholders. Therefore, the GAAP operating margin of 26.1% is the true measure of economic profitability, not the 40.2% touted in management presentations.  
Despite this, the trajectory is positive. GAAP operating margins expanded by nearly 400 basis points from FY24 to FY25. This demonstrates genuine operating leverage—revenue grew 16% while operating expenses grew at a slower pace. This leverage is partly attributed to the company's investment in AI ("Intuit Assist"), which is automating customer support and expert review tasks, thereby lowering the cost to serve in the labor-intensive "Live" segments.

### **3.2 Revenue Durability and Recurring Nature**

Intuit has successfully transitioned to a recurring revenue model. The "Online Ecosystem" revenue, which is primarily subscription-based, grew 20% in FY2025.1 Recurring revenue is highly valued in the Buffett framework because it provides predictability and reduces the need to "re-win" customers every year.

* **QuickBooks Online:** Operates on a monthly SaaS model with high retention.  
* **TurboTax:** While technically seasonal, the behavior is recurring. Taxpayers file every year. However, the shift to "Live" creates a higher recurring revenue floor as customers become accustomed to the service.  
* **Credit Karma:** This is the least durable segment, as it relies on transaction volume (loan originations). It is cyclical and sensitive to interest rate environments.

### **3.3 Balance Sheet Strength**

Intuit maintains a solid balance sheet, though leverage has increased following the Mailchimp acquisition.

* **Cash and Investments:** $4.6 billion (as of July 31, 2025).1  
* **Total Debt:** $6.0 billion.1  
* **Net Debt:** \~$1.4 billion.

The company operates with a net debt position, which is manageable given its robust cash flow generation. Operating cash flow in FY2025 was $6.2 billion.9 The debt-to-EBITDA ratio is conservative, well below 2.0x. However, the balance sheet carries a massive amount of Goodwill—$13.98 billion as of October 2025 10—representing the premium paid for acquisitions. This intangible asset creates a risk of impairment charges if the acquired businesses (specifically Mailchimp) fail to meet growth expectations, which would impact GAAP earnings.

### **3.4 Cash Flow Efficiency**

Intuit is capital light. Capital expenditures (CapEx) are minimal relative to operating cash flow. In FY2025, CapEx was estimated at approximately $124 million 11, down from $250 million in FY2024. This low capital intensity means that the majority of operating cash flow converts directly to Free Cash Flow (FCF), allowing for aggressive capital returns to shareholders.  
**Table 2: Cash Flow Profile (FY2025)**

| Metric | Amount ($ Millions) |
| :---- | :---- |
| **Operating Cash Flow** | $6,210 |
| **Capital Expenditures** | $(124) |
| **Free Cash Flow (FCF)** | **$6,086** |
| *Stock Repurchases* | $(2,800) |
| *Dividends Paid* | $(1,190) |

The FCF conversion is exemplary. For every dollar of revenue, Intuit generates roughly $0.32 in free cash flow. This financial engine provides the fuel for the company's "Big Bets" strategy and offers a buffer against economic downturns.

## ---

**4\. Strategic Evolution: AI and Market Expansion**

To understand future intrinsic value, one must analyze where growth will come from. Intuit is currently executing a strategic pivot centered on Artificial Intelligence and moving up-market.

### **4.1 The "GenOS" and Intuit Assist**

Intuit has deployed a proprietary Generative AI Operating System (GenOS) across its platform. "Intuit Assist" functions as an AI copilot embedded in QuickBooks, TurboTax, Mailchimp, and Credit Karma.

* **Consumer Application:** Assist can explain tax calculations, identify missing deductions, and draft responses to IRS notices.  
* **SMB Application:** Assist automates invoice creation, categorizes expenses, chases overdue payments, and generates marketing content in Mailchimp.

This is not merely a feature update; it is a deflationary force on Intuit's own cost structure. By automating tasks that previously required human intervention (either by the customer or an Intuit expert), the company can serve more customers with fewer resources. In FY2025, the company noted that the combination of AI and human experts is resonating, with QuickBooks Live customer growth of 61% in Q1 FY2026.12 This suggests the hybrid model is scalable and creates a distinct competitive advantage over local accounting firms that lack access to such technology.

### **4.2 Disrupting the Mid-Market**

Historically, Intuit dominated the "small" end of the SMB market. As businesses grew in complexity, they would churn off QuickBooks and migrate to Oracle NetSuite, Sage Intacct, or Microsoft Dynamics. This churn represented a leak in the bucket of Intuit’s most valuable customers.  
To plug this leak, Intuit launched the **Intuit Enterprise Suite (IES)**, targeting businesses with $10 million to $100 million in revenue.5 This move expands the Total Addressable Market (TAM) by approximately $89 billion. Early results are promising: QBO Advanced and IES revenue grew 40% in FY2025.5 Capturing this mid-market segment allows Intuit to significantly increase Average Revenue Per User (ARPU)—moving from \~$50/month subscriptions to multi-thousand dollar annual contracts—while retaining customers for longer periods.

### **4.3 Risks to the Strategy**

* **Execution Risk in Mailchimp:** The integration of marketing data with financial data is theoretically sound but practically difficult. If Intuit cannot prove to SMBs that using Mailchimp leads to directly attributable revenue in QuickBooks, the cross-sell thesis falls apart. The lagging growth of Mailchimp relative to the rest of the ecosystem is a warning sign that this value proposition has not yet fully landed with customers.  
* **AI Commoditization:** While Intuit has a data advantage, the rapid democratization of AI models means that competitors (like Xero or new startups) can also access powerful LLMs. If AI makes software easier to build, the moat around the *software* itself erodes, leaving only the moat around the *data* and the *brand*.

## ---

**5\. Intrinsic Value Calculation**

Following Buffett’s philosophy, we calculate the intrinsic value using the "Owner Earnings" method and a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis. We purposefully avoid using Non-GAAP numbers that exclude SBC, as we view SBC as a real economic cost.

### **5.1 Owner Earnings Analysis**

Buffett defines Owner Earnings as: *Reported Earnings \+ Depreciation/Amortization \- Capital Expenditures \- (Additional Working Capital).*  
Using FY2025 data:

* **Net Income (GAAP):** $3.90 billion.1  
* **Depreciation & Amortization:** \~$1.0 billion (Estimate based on FY24 $1.3B and Q1 FY26 run rates).10  
* **Capital Expenditures:** $0.12 billion.11  
* **Change in Working Capital:** Assumed neutral for a steady-state calculation.  
* **Owner Earnings:** $3.90 \+ $1.0 \- $0.12 \= **$4.78 billion**.

*Note: We do not subtract SBC again because it is already deducted to arrive at GAAP Net Income. However, we acknowledge that the cash flow statement shows higher cash generation ($6.2B) because SBC is added back. Buffett would focus on the $4.78 billion figure because the cash "savings" from paying employees in stock is offset by the dilution of the equity base.*  
Valuation Multiple:  
For a high-quality business with a wide moat and double-digit growth prospects, a multiple of 25x Owner Earnings is reasonable in a standard interest rate environment (3-4% 10-year Treasury).

* **Implied Enterprise Value:** $4.78 billion \* 25 \= $119.5 billion.  
* **Plus Net Cash:** \~$1.0 billion.  
* **Implied Market Cap:** \~$120.5 billion.  
* **Current Market Cap:** \~$184.4 billion.  
* **Implied Intrinsic Value per Share:** \~$426.

This simple heuristic suggests the stock is currently trading at a significant premium (roughly 56% overvalued) relative to a conservative 25x multiple of GAAP owner earnings.

### **5.2 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis**

To capture the growth potential, we utilize a 3-stage DCF model.  
**Assumptions:**

* **WACC (Discount Rate):** 9.0% (Reflecting a 4.17% risk-free rate 13, 1.27 Beta 14, and 5% equity risk premium).  
* **Growth Phase (Years 1-5):** 12% CAGR. This aligns with the lower end of management’s long-term guidance (12-13% for FY26).1 We assume Intuit can maintain double-digit growth driven by the mid-market expansion and "Live" services.  
* **Terminal Growth:** 3.0% (Inflation \+ GDP).  
* **FCF Margin:** We use a normalized FCF margin of 22% (GAAP Net Income margin proxy to penalize for SBC).

**Projections:**

* **FY2026 Revenue:** $21.1 billion. **FCF:** $4.6 billion.  
* **FY2027 Revenue:** $23.6 billion. **FCF:** $5.2 billion.  
* **FY2028 Revenue:** $26.5 billion. **FCF:** $5.8 billion.  
* **FY2029 Revenue:** $29.7 billion. **FCF:** $6.5 billion.  
* **FY2030 Revenue:** $33.2 billion. **FCF:** $7.3 billion.

**Calculation:**

* **PV of Cash Flows (Years 1-5):** \~$22.0 billion.  
* **Terminal Value:** ($7.3B \* 1.03) / (0.09 \- 0.03) \= $125.3 billion.  
* **PV of Terminal Value:** $125.3B / (1.09)^5 \= \~$81.4 billion.  
* **Total Enterprise Value:** $22.0B \+ $81.4B \= $103.4 billion.  
* **Plus Net Cash:** $1.0 billion.  
* **Total Equity Value:** $104.4 billion.  
* **Diluted Shares:** 283 million.  
* **Intrinsic Value per Share:** **$369**.

Sensitivity Analysis (Bull Case):  
If we accept the market's premise and value Intuit on Non-GAAP FCF (ignoring SBC) and assume 15% growth:

* FCF Margin rises to \~33% (Non-GAAP Op Margin proxy).  
* Growth rate: 15%.  
* **Intrinsic Value per Share (Bull):** **$685**.

Valuation Conclusion:  
The current share price of \~$667 15 is trading near our "Bull Case" scenario. The market is effectively pricing Intuit as if Stock-Based Compensation is not a real expense and assuming growth will accelerate or maintain high double-digits indefinitely. Under a strict GAAP-based Buffett framework, which penalizes for dilution, the intrinsic value is significantly lower, likely in the $370 \- $430 range.

## ---

**6\. Margin of Safety and Investment Verdict**

The final step in the Buffett philosophy is the "Margin of Safety." This concept dictates that an investor should only buy a stock at a price significantly below its calculated intrinsic value to protect against errors in analysis or unforeseen macroeconomic shocks.  
**The Price vs. Value Disconnect**

* **Current Price:** \~$667.  
* **Estimated Intrinsic Value (GAAP Basis):** \~$400.  
* **Premium to Intrinsic Value:** \~67%.

There is currently **no margin of safety** in Intuit’s stock price. The valuation presumes:

1. Successful defense against the IRS Direct File threat with minimal revenue erosion.  
2. Continued double-digit growth in the SMB segment despite macroeconomic headwinds (high interest rates affecting small businesses).  
3. Successful re-acceleration of the Mailchimp asset.  
4. No multiple compression from the current \~34x GAAP P/E levels.

Insider Signals  
It is notable that key insiders have been net sellers. Scott Cook, the founder and largest individual shareholder (owning \~4.36% of the company), sold shares in December 2025.16 While founders often sell for diversification, the lack of insider buying at these levels reinforces the view that the stock is fully valued.  
Institutional Ownership  
Institutional ownership stands at approximately 86% 17, indicating that the stock is a crowded trade among professional money managers. This high ownership level can lead to volatility if growth expectations are missed, as the "exit door" becomes crowded.

## ---

**7\. Key Risks and Monitorables**

Investors holding or considering Intuit must closely monitor the following risks, which could permanently impair the intrinsic value:  
1\. Regulatory/Legislative Risk (The "Kill Switch")  
The IRS Direct File program is the most potent threat. If the government mandates or heavily incentivizes the use of Direct File for all income levels, the Consumer Tax segment (roughly 26% of revenue) could face secular decline. Lobbying efforts, on which Intuit has spent millions, are yielding diminishing returns as political will shifts toward simplifying the tax filing process.18  
2\. Interest Rate Sensitivity  
Intuit serves SMBs and consumers who are sensitive to interest rates.

* **QuickBooks:** High rates increase the failure rate of small businesses (churn).  
* **Credit Karma:** High rates reduce the demand for mortgages and personal loans, directly impacting lead generation revenue.  
* **Valuation:** A higher-for-longer rate environment increases the discount rate (WACC), punishing the valuation of long-duration growth assets like Intuit.

3\. Integration Fatigue  
The divergence in performance between the core platform and Mailchimp suggests integration fatigue. If management is distracted by fixing Mailchimp, they may miss shifts in the core accounting market.

## ---

**8\. Conclusion**

Intuit Inc. is a textbook example of a high-quality business trading at a speculative price. It possesses a wide economic moat in its SMB segment, characterized by high switching costs and pricing power. Its management is visionary, successfully pivoting the company through major technological shifts.  
However, the "price is what you pay, value is what you get" adage is paramount here. At \~$667, investors are paying a premium multiple for a company facing its most significant regulatory challenge in decades (IRS Direct File) and dealing with integration friction in its largest acquisition (Mailchimp). The current valuation leaves no room for error. A strict adherence to Warren Buffett’s principles—demanding a margin of safety and accounting for SBC as a real cost—leads to the conclusion that Intuit is currently **overvalued**.  
**Actionable Recommendation:**

* **Avoid** initiating new positions at current levels ($660+).  
* **Monitor** the stock for a pullback to the **$450-$500** range, where the price would begin to align with a conservative estimate of intrinsic value.  
* **Watch** the 2026 tax season results closely for data on Direct File adoption; significant traction there would necessitate a permanent downward revision of the Consumer segment's terminal value.

*Disclaimer: This report is for educational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice.*

## ---

**9\. Appendix: Financial Tables**

**Table 3: Recent Quarterly Performance Trends (Revenue in Millions)**

| Quarter | Global Business Solutions | Growth YoY | Consumer (TurboTax) | Growth YoY | Credit Karma | Growth YoY |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Q1 FY26** | $3,013 | 18% | $894 | 21% | $651 | 27% |
| **Q4 FY25** | $3,013 | 18% | $137 | 21% | $649 | 34% |
| **Q3 FY25** | $2,849 | 19% | $4,048 | 11% | $579 | 31% |
| **Q2 FY25** | $2,671 | 19% | $509 | 3% | $511 | 36% |

1  
**Table 4: Stock-Based Compensation History**

| Fiscal Year | SBC Expense ($ Millions) | % of Revenue |
| :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **FY 2025** | $1,968 | 10.5% |
| **FY 2024** | $1,940 | 11.9% |
| **FY 2023** | $1,712 | 11.9% |
| **FY 2022** | $1,308 | 10.3% |

19

#### **Works cited**

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