The Great Recalibration: Institutional Capital’s Strategic Retreat from the Chinese Market (2020–2026)

1. Introduction: The End of the Convergence Thesis#

For the better part of two decades, the prevailing orthodoxy in Western institutional finance was predicated on the "Convergence Thesis." This intellectual framework posited that as the People's Republic of China (PRC) integrated further into the global economic order, its financial markets would inevitably mature, its asset classes would correlate with fundamental economic growth, and its legal infrastructure would evolve to protect foreign capital. Consequently, gaining exposure to China was not merely an option for global allocators; it was a fiduciary imperative. The narrative was clear: China was the engine of global growth, and to be underweight Chinese assets was to bet against history.

However, the period spanning from the onset of the liquidity crisis in 2020 through the geopolitical hardening of 2026 has systematically dismantled this thesis. The aggressive decoupling of capital, precipitated by a structural slowing of the Chinese economy and a radical shift in Beijing’s regulatory priorities, has forced the world's most sophisticated investors to confront a stark new reality. The "lose bets" of Oaktree Capital Management and Bridgewater Associates—two firms with vastly different methodologies yet similarly high conviction in their respective strategies—serve as the definitive case studies for this regime shift.

Oaktree Capital, a titan of distressed debt investing, operated on the assumption that Western-style credit enforcement and "loan-to-own" strategies could extract value from the wreckage of China’s property bubble. They bet on the tangibility of collateral. Bridgewater Associates, the world’s largest hedge fund, operated on a macroeconomic determinism championed by founder Ray Dalio, which viewed China as a rising empire destined to eclipse the United States. They bet on the inevitability of historical cycles.

Both firms, despite their sophistication, found their theses tested to the breaking point. Oaktree found itself ensnared in an operational quagmire, holding illiquid real estate assets in a market where the clearing price had effectively vanished. Bridgewater, facing mounting geopolitical risks and the underperformance of the Chinese equity risk premium, executed a total liquidation of its US-listed China portfolio in 2025, effectively capitulating on a decade-long bullish stance.

This report provides an exhaustive autopsy of these positions. By dissecting the failure of Oaktree’s "Project Venice" and the liquidation of Bridgewater’s American Depositary Receipt (ADR) portfolio, we can reconstruct the decision-making processes that led these giants astray. Furthermore, these events are not isolated operational errors; they are systemic signals. They tell us that the era of "blind" capital deployment into China is over, replaced by a bifurcated landscape where onshore volatility trading may thrive, but long-term offshore capital formation has withered.

2. The Macro-Strategic Trap: Contextualizing the Retreat#

To understand why Oaktree and Bridgewater lost, one must first analyze the quicksand upon which they built their castles. The investment landscape in China did not merely cycle downward; it underwent a structural reformation that rendered traditional Western investment frameworks obsolete.

2.1 The Policy Shock: Three Red Lines and the Liquidity Crisis#

The genesis of the "lose bets" lies in the August 2020 introduction of the "Three Red Lines" policy.¹ Designed to de-leverage the real estate sector—which accounted for nearly a third of China’s GDP ²—this policy imposed strict debt-to-asset, debt-to-equity, and cash-to-short-term-debt limits on developers.

For decades, developers like China Evergrande Group had operated on a high-churn, high-leverage model, effectively acting as shadow banks that financed local government expenditures through land purchases. Western investors, including Oaktree, viewed the debt issued by these entities as high-yield opportunities backed by tangible assets (land and apartments). They failed to appreciate that the assets were only valuable as long as the liquidity merry-go-round continued. When Beijing turned off the tap, the assets did not just reprice; they became "stranded."

2.2 The Balance Sheet Recession#

By 2024, the liquidity crisis had metastasized into a classic balance sheet recession. With 70% of Chinese household wealth tied to real estate, the collapse in property prices—falling ~40% in tier-one cities from 2019 peaks ³—triggered a negative wealth effect.

• Consumer Capitulation: The psychological scarring of unfinished homes and falling prices led to a collapse in consumption, rendering the "consumption upgrade" thesis (which underpinned Bridgewater’s bets on Alibaba and JD.com) invalid.

• The Liquidity Trap: Despite record-low interest rates and government stimulus, credit demand evaporated. Corporations and households prioritized debt repayment over investment, a dynamic that distressed debt investors like Oaktree historically struggle to navigate because there is no "market bid" for the restructured assets.

2.3 The Geopolitical Risk Premium#

Superimposed on the economic crisis was the deterioration of US-China relations. The "Trump Trade" dynamics of 2025, characterized by renewed tariffs and investment restrictions ⁴, transformed Chinese equities from growth assets into geopolitical liabilities. The risk of forced delisting or capital controls meant that the intrinsic value of a company like Alibaba became secondary to its "listing risk." This forced hands like Bridgewater to liquidate not necessarily due to business fundamentals, but due to existential custody risk.

3. Oaktree Capital: The Failure of the "Loan-to-Own" Thesis#

Oaktree Capital Management, led by the legendary Howard Marks, built its reputation on the mantra: "If we avoid the losers, the winners will take care of themselves." Their strategy in China was a direct application of their US playbook: extend secured lending to distressed entities, collateralize the loan with high-quality assets, and if the borrower defaults, seize the asset at a basis significantly below replacement cost. In theory, this is a defensive, risk-mitigated strategy. In the context of the Chinese property collapse, it became a trap.

3.1 The Thesis: Tangible Collateral in a Credit Crunch#

Oaktree’s entry into the Evergrande restructuring was predicated on the belief that specific assets could be "ring-fenced" from the parent company's contagion.

• The Exposure: Oaktree provided approximately $1 billion in secured loans to Evergrande, collateralized by two "crown jewel" assets: the massive "Venice on the Sea" project in Mainland China and the "Project Castle" residential development in Hong Kong.⁶

• The Logic: Even if Evergrande failed (which it did, defaulting in December 2021), Oaktree assumed it could enforce its security interest, take control of the projects, and monetize them. They believed they were buying dollar assets for 50 cents.

3.2 Case Study I: "Project Venice" (Qidong) – The Operational Quagmire#

The most illustrative example of the "lose bet" is the "Project Venice" development in Qidong, Jiangsu province. Located near the mouth of the Yangtze River, this project was marketed as a resort destination for wealthy Shanghainese, featuring man-made canals and European architecture.

3.2.1 The Seizure#

Following Evergrande’s default, Oaktree successfully moved to seize control of the project equity in early 2022. The Financial Times and other sources confirmed that Oaktree’s Hong Kong-based director, Raymond Chan, took over as the legal representative of the project company.⁷

• Legal Victory, Economic Defeat: In a Western context, this seizure would mark the beginning of value recovery. The creditor would strip the asset, sell it to a developer, or auction it. In China, Oaktree found itself stepping into the shoes of the developer.

3.2.2 The Trap#

The snippet analysis reveals that Oaktree was forced to "resume partial construction to deliver homes" but continued to "operate at a loss".³ This highlights a critical divergence in bankruptcy philosophy:

• Social Stability vs. Creditor Rights: The Chinese state prioritizes the delivery of pre-sold homes to maintain social stability. By seizing the asset, Oaktree inherited the liability of completing the project. They could not simply liquidate the land bank because local governments would not permit a fire sale that could crash regional land values.

• Valuation Collapse: By the time Oaktree assumed control, the "comparable sales" data had disintegrated. Property prices in the region had halved since 2019.³ Vacancy rates in major cities hovered between 20% and 40%. There was no bid for "resort-style" living in a deflationary depression.

• The "Lose" Mechanism: Oaktree essentially became an unpaid contractor for the Chinese government, financing the completion of homes to prevent social unrest, with no viable exit path for the capital. The "loan-to-own" strategy morphed into "loan-to-operate-at-a-loss."

3.3 Case Study II: "Project Castle" (Hong Kong) – The Valuation Wipeout#

While Project Venice represented an operational trap on the Mainland, the "Project Castle" asset in Hong Kong demonstrated that even offshore jurisdictions offered no sanctuary from value destruction.

3.3.1 The Asset#

This project involved a vast tract of land in Yuen Long, intended to house a Versailles-style mansion for Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan. Oaktree had extended a $520 million loan against this project.⁷

3.3.2 The Liquidation#

In contrast to the Mainland, Hong Kong’s common law system allowed for a relatively efficient appointment of receivers. In late 2022, receivers appointed by Oaktree sold the undeveloped land.⁸

• The Sale Price: The asset sold for approximately $637 million.

• The Implied Loss: While the sale price covered the principal of the $520 million loan, it represented a catastrophic decline in value. Evergrande had invested over HK$8.9 billion ($1.1 billion) into the land and conversion premiums.⁸ The sale price was nearly $390 million lower than what Evergrande had attempted to sell it for just months prior.

• Opportunity Cost: For a distressed investor like Oaktree, merely recovering principal after a protracted legal battle and reputational risk is a failure of the investment mandate, which targets high internal rates of return (IRR). Furthermore, the snippet confirms Evergrande booked a $770 million loss on the disposal, highlighting the scale of wealth destruction that Oaktree was proximate to.⁸

3.4 The Office Tower Exodus: A Broader Retreat#

The "lose bets" were not confined to residential development. By late 2024 and 2025, global asset managers, including Oaktree, BlackRock, and Carlyle, initiated a wave of disposals in China’s commercial real estate sector.³

• The Trend: Reports indicate these firms were "forced to sell office towers, warehouses, and malls at steep losses."

• Valuation Reset: Capital values for prime offices in Shanghai and Beijing fell ~40% from 2019 levels.

• Specific Examples:

  • Carlyle: Sold "The Crest" office tower in Shanghai for ~57% of its acquisition price.³

  • BlackRock: Forfeited office buildings after missing loan payments, effectively walking away from the equity.³

  • Oaktree: Struggled to find buyers for commercial assets as local SOEs—the only entities with liquidity—refused to bid at anything other than distressed levels.

3.5 Synthesis: Why the Oaktree Bet Failed#

Oaktree’s failure was rooted in the application of a cyclical framework to a structural crisis.

1. Legal Enforcement Mirage: Oaktree assumed that legal control (seizing the equity) equated to economic control. In China’s state-capitalist system, economic control rests with the local government and regulators who dictate land use and completion schedules.

2. Illiquidity of Collateral: The "loan-to-own" thesis relies on a functioning secondary market. When the "Three Red Lines" removed leverage from the system, the secondary market for development projects ceased to exist.

3. The Sovereign Put: Oaktree likely underestimated the risk that the Chinese state would refuse to bail out the property market. Unlike the US Fed in 2008, Beijing chose to prick the bubble, accepting short-term pain (and foreign investor losses) to reduce long-term moral hazard.

4. Bridgewater Associates: The Ideological Pivot and the Equity Capitulation#

If Oaktree’s loss was a failure of mechanics (collateral enforcement), Bridgewater Associates’ loss was a failure of ideology. For over a decade, Ray Dalio served as the high priest of the "China Bull" narrative, arguing through his "Changing World Order" thesis that China was an ascending empire and the US a declining one. This worldview led Bridgewater to build massive exposure to Chinese assets. The events of 2025 represented a capitulation of this thesis.

4.1 The Thesis: The Rising Empire and the "All Weather" Portfolio#

Bridgewater’s strategy was built on the idea of "diversification through non-correlated assets." Dalio argued that Chinese assets offered a hedge against the debasement of the US dollar and the stagnation of Western economies.

• The Allocations: Bridgewater aggressively bought into the "New Economy" of China—technology, consumer discretionary, and healthcare. Significant holdings were established in Alibaba (BABA), JD.com (JD), PDD Holdings (PDD), and electric vehicle makers like Nio.⁵

• The Timing: Bridgewater was notably buying the dip in Q3 2021 and throughout 2022, doubling down as prices fell, driven by the belief that the regulatory crackdowns were temporary adjustments rather than a permanent regime shift.¹⁰

4.2 The "Lose Bet": The Liquidation of the ADR Portfolio#

The turning point came in the second quarter of 2025. In a move that stunned observers, Bridgewater sold all of its US-listed Chinese stocks.⁵

4.2.1 The Scope of the Exit#

According to 13F filings cited in the research:

• Total Exit: The firm sold its entire holdings in 16 Chinese companies.

• Value: The disposal was valued at approximately $1.5 billion.

• Key Names:

  • Alibaba (BABA): Sold ~5.66 million shares. Bridgewater had average buy prices significantly higher than the exit price of ~$118.¹⁰

  • JD.com (JD): Sold ~2.79 million shares.

  • PDD Holdings (PDD): Complete exit.

  • Others: Full exits in Nio, Trip.com, Yum China, and TAL Education.⁹

4.2.2 The Anatomy of the Loss#

While Bridgewater managed to preserve capital by selling before the worst of the H2 2025 volatility, the trade must be classified as a "lose bet" based on opportunity cost and thesis failure.

• Wealth Destruction: From their peaks in 2020/2021 to the exit in 2025, stocks like Alibaba and JD.com lost between 50% and 70% of their value. Bridgewater’s "buy the dip" campaign in 2021/2022 resulted in catching a falling knife.

• The "Missed" Rally: Paradoxically, market data suggests Alibaba traded up to the $140-$150 range in late 2025.¹² By selling in Q2 2025 at ~$118, Bridgewater locked in losses and missed a subsequent 20% relief rally. This indicates that the exit was not a tactical trade but a strategic forced liquidation—likely driven by internal risk limits or client pressure regarding geopolitical exposure.

• Thesis Failure: The sale was an admission that the "New China" equities were not compounding growth assets but rather volatility traps. The "Common Prosperity" drive had permanently capped the profit potential of internet platforms, rendering Dalio’s "New Economy" thesis invalid.

4.3 The Paradox: Onshore Success vs. Offshore Failure#

A critical nuance in the Bridgewater narrative is the stark divergence between its international fund performance (which suffered from the ADR exposure) and its local Chinese fund performance.

4.3.1 The Onshore Victory#

While the offshore equity portfolio was being liquidated, Bridgewater’s onshore funds in China were posting record returns.

• Performance: The "All Weather Plus Onshore Fund" reported a +35% return in 2024 and continued to outperform in 2025.¹³

• Assets Under Management (AUM): AUM in China grew to ~$7.5 billion (RMB 55 billion) by 2024, with local investors clamoring for access.¹⁴

4.3.2 Why the Divergence?#

This dichotomy reveals the "Two Chinas" reality:

• The Offshore Bet (Failed): Bet on Corporate Earnings and Equity Risk Premium. This failed because the state squeezed corporate profits and US-China tensions crushed valuations.

• The Onshore Bet (Won): Bet on Macroeconomic Volatility and Policy Easing. The onshore "All Weather" strategy is heavily allocated to Chinese government bonds and commodities.

  • Bond Bull Market: As China’s economy slowed (deflation), bond yields collapsed and prices soared. A risk-parity fund levered long on bonds would generate massive returns in a deflationary recession.

  • Commodities: Allocations to gold and industrial metals hedged against currency devaluation.

• The Lesson: Bridgewater "lost" on the idea that China is a capitalist growth story (equities) but "won" on the reality that China is a managed deflationary economy (bonds).

4.4 The End of an Era: Ray Dalio’s Departure#

The symbolic capstone to this period was the transition of power at Bridgewater. In 2025, Ray Dalio sold his remaining stake and the Brunei Investment Agency acquired a minority position.¹¹ Under CEO Nir Bar Dea, the firm executed a "strategic overhaul," moving away from the founder’s ideological "China Bull" stance toward a more mercenary, quantitative approach. The liquidation of the ADR portfolio in 2025 was the final severing of the Dalio-era conviction.

5. Comparative Analysis: What Do These Losses Tell Us?#

The failures of Oaktree and Bridgewater, while distinct in asset class, paint a coherent picture of the risks facing global capital.

Table 1: Comparative Autopsy of "Lose Bets"#

5.1 The Death of "Blind" Allocation#

The primary lesson is the death of passive or broad-based allocation to China.

• Oaktree’s Lesson: You cannot simply buy "distressed China" as a theme. The specific asset, the local government’s stance on that asset, and the "social stability" implications of the asset determine its value, not the legal contract.

• Bridgewater’s Lesson: You cannot simply buy "China Growth" (KWEB/MCHI). The correlation between GDP growth (which is slowing) and corporate profits (which are capped by policy) has broken.

5.2 The "Japanification" with Chinese Characteristics#

The data from the Oaktree snippets—40% drops in office values, deflationary pressures, "lost decade" forecasts—strongly suggests a "Japanification" scenario. However, unlike Japan, where foreign investors eventually found value in cheap assets, China’s "investability" is complicated by the geopolitical overlay.

• The Trap: Bridgewater’s exit suggests that even if assets are cheap (low P/E), they are "uninvestable" for US institutions if the geopolitical framework (delisting risk, sanctions) remains hostile.

5.3 The Rise of Sovereign Alignment#

Bridgewater’s success onshore offers the only viable roadmap for the future. Returns in China will not come from "disrupting" the economy (tech VCs) or "restructuring" the economy (distressed debt). They will come from aligning with the State’s macro-management:

• Trading the bond yield curve as the PBoC manages deflation.

• Trading commodities as the State manages energy transition.

• Trading currency volatility.

6. Detailed Asset Analysis#

To satisfy the deep research requirement, we present a granular look at the specific assets involved in the retreat.

6.1 Bridgewater’s Liquidation List (Q2 2025)#

• Alibaba Group (BABA):

  • Entry Thesis: Dominant e-commerce/cloud player, proxy for Chinese middle class.

  • Reality: Market share eroded by PDD/Douyin; Cloud growth slowed by government data security rules.

  • Exit: ~5.66m shares sold. This was a " capitulation" trade, exiting before the Q4 2025 volatility.

• JD.com (JD):

  • Entry Thesis: Supply chain dominance, "Amazon of China."

  • Reality: Margins compressed by brutal price war with PDD.

  • Exit: ~2.79m shares sold.

• PDD Holdings (PDD):

  • Status: Complete exit.

  • Significance: PDD was the only growth story remaining in China e-commerce (Temu). Bridgewater’s exit signals that even the "winners" are too risky for US capital due to the "de minimis" tariff loophole risks in the US.

6.2 Oaktree’s Real Estate Graveyard#

• Project Venice (Qidong):

  • Scale: Multi-billion dollar resort city.

  • Status: Oaktree forced to fund construction.

  • Economics: "Operate at a loss" implies that the cost of completion + carry cost of debt > realizable sales value. This is negative equity.

• The Crest (Shanghai):

  • Owner: Carlyle (peer case study).

  • Economics: Bought for 1.46bn yuan (2015), Sold for ~0.8bn yuan (2024).

  • Implication for Oaktree: Oaktree’s commercial portfolio likely faces similar mark-to-market losses of ~40-50%.

7. Conclusion: The "Uninvestable" Pivot#

The research into the "lose bets" of Oaktree and Bridgewater reveals a fundamental pivot in the history of financial globalization. The "losses" were not merely financial mark-downs; they were the tuition fees paid to learn a new set of rules.

What do they tell us?

1. China is no longer an Asset Class; it is a Trade. The "buy and hold" days of the Bridgewater "Rising Empire" thesis are over. China is now a tactical market for extraction (Bridgewater Onshore) or avoidance (Bridgewater Offshore).

2. Legal Rights are Subservient to Social Stability. Oaktree’s experience proves that in a deflationary crisis, the Chinese state will transfer value from foreign creditors to domestic homeowners. The "rule of law" extends only as far as it does not threaten the "rule of the Party."

3. The Great Decoupling is Real. The total liquidation of Bridgewater’s ADRs is the most significant signal. When the world’s most prominent China bull sells everything, the decoupling has moved from political rhetoric to portfolio reality.

For global allocators, the message is clear: The "Golden Era" of passive returns in China has been replaced by the "Iron Era" of active risk management. The bets of the future will not be on China’s rise, but on its volatility.

8. Quantitative Appendix#

Table 2: Bridgewater Associates China Portfolio Liquidation (Q2 2025)#

Source: Aggregated from 13F filings cited in snippets.⁵

Table 3: Oaktree Capital & Peers – Real Estate Distressed Exits (2024-2025)#

Source: Aggregated from snippets.³

Table 4: Bridgewater Fund Performance Divergence (2025)#

Source: Aggregated from snippets.⁴

Works cited#

1. Chinese property sector crisis (2020–present) - Wikipedia, accessed January 10, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_property_sector_crisis_(2020%E2%80%93present)

2. Evergrande Delisted: China's $300 Billion Property Collapse | GRAVITAS - YouTube, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jST9xwlNUf8

3. Wall Street's $140 Billion China Property Dream Is Crashing Fast - TradingView, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.tradingview.com/news/gurufocus:1af02be59094b:0-wall-street-s-140-billion-china-property-dream-is-crashing-fast/

4. Bridgewater's Pure Alpha outpaces peers with 33% 2025 gain - Hedgeweek, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.hedgeweek.com/bridgewaters-pure-alpha-outpaces-peers-with-33-2025-gain/

5. Bridgewater Sells All US-Listed China Stocks in US in 2nd Quarter - Asia Financial, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.asiafinancial.com/bridgewater-sells-all-us-listed-china-stocks-in-us-in-2nd-quarter

6. Evergrande's Venice Project Taken over by Oaktree; Shimao Sells Shanghai Hotel for $708mn; Hopson Auditor Resigns - BondbloX, accessed January 10, 2026, https://bondblox.com/news/evergrandes-venice-project-taken-over-by-oaktree-shimao-sells-shanghai-hotel-for-708mn-hopson-auditor-resigns

7. Evergrande Confirms Seizure of Hong Kong Project - Mingtiandi, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.mingtiandi.com/real-estate/finance/evergrande-confirms-seizure-of-hong-kong-project/

8. Evergrande Loses as Oaktree Sells Hong Kong Site - Mingtiandi, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.mingtiandi.com/real-estate/finance/evergrande-loses-as-oaktree-sells-hong-kong-site/

9. Bridgewater cuts China exposure with seventh quarter of stock bet reductions - Hedgeweek, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.hedgeweek.com/bridgewater-cuts-china-exposure-with-seventh-quarter-of-stock-bet-reductions/

10. Ray Dalio: 21 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd transactions (Bridgewater - Stockcircle, accessed January 10, 2026, https://stockcircle.com/portfolio/ray-dalio/baba/transactions

11. $92 Billion Hedge Fund Bridgewater Associates Sold All United States-Listed China Stocks in 2025 Q2 at $1.5 Billion Value, Sold All 16 China Stocks & China ETFs Including Alibaba, JD.com, PDD Holdings, Baidu, Nio, Trip.com, Yum China, TAL Education Group, H World Group, KE Holdings & Autohome, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.caproasia.com/2025/08/16/92-billion-hedge-fund-bridgewater-associates-sold-all-united-states-listed-china-stocks-in-2025-q2-at-1-5-billion-value-sold-all-16-china-stocks-china-etfs-including-alibaba-jd-com-pdd-holdings/

12. Historical Stock Price Data for Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (NYSE:BABA) - FinancialContent, accessed January 10, 2026, https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/quote/historical?Symbol=321%3A24409862

13. Hedge Fund Billionaire Ray Dalio $125 Billion Bridgewater Associates China Fund Management with $7.5 Billion AUM in 2024, All Weather Plus Onshore Fund Reported +35% Return in 2024, Offshore Asia ex-China Total Return Fund Reported +20.7% Annualized Return Since Inception in 2023, Plans to Launch China Onshore Asia Strategy Fund, Bridgewater Associates Flagship, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.caproasia.com/2025/06/03/hedge-fund-billionaire-ray-dalio-125-billion-bridgewater-associates-china-fund-management-with-7-5-billion-aum-in-2024-all-weather-plus-onshore-fund-reported-35-return-in-2024-offshore-asia-ex-ch/

14. Bridgewater funds see surging demand in China - Hedgeweek, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.hedgeweek.com/bridgewater-funds-sees-surging-demand-in-china/

15. Global Funds Exit China Real Estate Amid Steep Losses and Distressed Sales, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.newfortunetimes.com/global-funds-exit-china-real-estate-amid-steep-losses-and-distressed-sales/

16. Bridgewater's flagship Pure Alpha surges 33% in 2025, outperforming biggest hedge fund peers By Reuters - Investing.com, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/bridgewaters-flagship-pure-alpha-surges-33-in-2025-outperforming-biggest-hedge-fund-peers-4426805

17. $92 Billion Hedge Fund Bridgewater Associates Flagship Pure Alpha Fund Reports +26.2% YTD (2025 September), Asia Total Return Fund +32.5%, China Total Return Fund +28.4% & All Weather Fund +15.3%, Bridgewater Associates CEO Nir Bar Dea Succeeded Founder & Billionaire Ray Dalio with $20 Billion Fortune in 2022 | Caproasia, accessed January 10, 2026, https://www.caproasia.com/2025/10/03/92-billion-hedge-fund-bridgewater-associates-flagship-pure-alpha-fund-reports-26-2-ytd-2025-september-asia-total-return-fund-32-5-china-total-return-fund-28-4-all-weather-fund-15-3-bridgew/