Apple (AAPL) Financial Research Report

Disclaimer: This content reflects the views of the author(s) as of the date indicated and is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not investment advice. Do your own due diligence with a licensed financial advisor before making any investment decisions.

Latest Quarter Earnings Summary#

Apple’s latest results for fiscal Q4 2025 (quarter ended Sept 27, 2025) marked a record September quarter. Revenue was $102.5 billion, up 8% year-over-year, setting all-time records for iPhone and Services revenue . Products revenue was $73.7 billion (+5.4% YoY) and Services revenue reached $28.75 billion (+15% YoY) . Quarterly gross margin was 47.2%, up from 46.2% in the prior year, as cost of sales rose more slowly than revenue . Operating income grew to $32.4 billion (up 9.6% YoY) , and net income doubled to $27.47 billion (Q4 2024 net income was depressed by a one-time tax charge) . Excluding that prior-year tax item, EPS rose 13% YoY; GAAP diluted EPS was $1.85 (versus $0.97 last year) . For the full fiscal year 2025, Apple reported revenue of $416.16 billion (+6.4% YoY) and net income of $112.0 billion (+19.5% YoY) . Notably, Services revenue hit an all-time high of $109.2 billion for FY2025 (+13.5% YoY) , while product sales (led by iPhone 17) also set a record for a September quarter. Apple’s installed base of active devices reached a new all-time high across all categories, reflecting strong customer loyalty . The company returned substantial cash to shareholders: the Board declared a dividend of $0.26/share for Nov 2025 , and Apple spent ~$90.7 billion on share buybacks during FY2025 . Overall, the Q4 2025 and FY2025 results underscore Apple’s resilience, with revenue growth reaccelerating (after a roughly flat FY2024) and double-digit EPS growth on an adjusted basis .

Business Model#

Core Business & Revenue Mix: Apple is a global technology company primarily selling consumer electronics and related software/services. Its business model centers on a tightly integrated ecosystem of hardware devices, operating systems, and services. The iPhone is Apple’s flagship product and largest revenue contributor (about 50% of FY2025 revenue) . Other hardware lines include the Mac computers (~8% of revenue), iPad tablets (~7%), and Wearables/Home/Accessories (Apple Watch, AirPods, etc., ~9%) . Apple also generates high-margin recurring income from Services (~26% of revenue) such as the App Store, Apple Music, iCloud, Apple TV+, Apple Pay, and extended warranties . The chart below shows Apple’s FY2025 revenue breakdown by category:

• iPhone: $209.6B (50.3%) – Smartphone sales
• Services: $109.2B (26.2%) – App Store fees, subscriptions, etc.
• Mac: $33.7B (8.1%) – Desktops and MacBook laptops
• Wearables, Home, Accessories: $35.7B (8.6%) – Apple Watch, AirPods, HomePod, etc.
• iPad: $28.0B (6.7%) – Tablet devices

(Pie Chart: Apple FY2025 Revenue by Segment)

Customer Base & Units Sold: Apple serves a massive global customer base with a loyal following. As of early 2025, Apple had over 2.35 billion active devices in its installed base – indicating well over a billion individual users given many own multiple Apple products. For example, there are more than 1 billion active iPhones in use worldwide . This installed base drives a virtuous cycle for services and repeat purchases. Apple no longer discloses unit sales per product, but industry estimates indicate it sold around 220 million iPhones in 2021 and similar levels in recent years. Other hardware lines sell in the tens of millions of units annually (e.g. ~50–60M iPads, ~20M Macs per year). Apple’s services segment also boasts large user counts – for instance, the company has over 1 billion paid subscriptions on its platform as of 2024 (including both Apple’s own services and third-party apps sold via the App Store). This scale of subscribers provides a steady, recurring revenue stream.

Value Proposition & Moat: Apple’s moat is built on a combination of powerful intangibles and ecosystem advantages. The company has one of the world’s most valuable brands and a reputation for premium quality and innovation. Customers are often deeply loyal to Apple products, resulting in high repurchase rates and willingness to pay premium prices. Importantly, Apple has created a walled-garden ecosystem of devices and services that work seamlessly together – iPhones, Macs, iPads, Apple Watch, AirPods, etc. all integrate via iCloud and proprietary software. This ecosystem lock-in creates high switching costs: an iPhone user with purchases in the App Store, iCloud storage, and AirPods is less likely to switch to Android. Apple’s fully integrated hardware/software design (e.g. custom silicon chips, operating systems) yields efficiency and user experience benefits competitors struggle to match . Additionally, Apple’s massive scale in procurement and its retail network give cost and distribution advantages. The App Store’s huge developer community is another moat – iOS has over 2 million apps, and developers are incentivized to build for Apple’s large-spending user base. All these factors – brand, customer loyalty, integrated ecosystem, scale, and a huge services platform – contribute to a durable competitive advantage for Apple.

Headwinds & Risks#

Despite its strengths, Apple faces several headwinds and risks in both the short and long term:

Short-Term / Cyclical Factors: In the near term, Apple’s results can be impacted by economic and industry conditions. A global economic slowdown or recession could dampen consumer demand for high-end electronics (many Apple products are premium-priced, discretionary purchases). For instance, currency exchange rates and inflation have affected recent results (strong USD headwinds in FY2022–23). Additionally, supply chain disruptions pose a risk: Apple relies on complex manufacturing partners (e.g. Foxconn) and a global component supply chain. Events like the 2020–2021 chip shortages, COVID-related factory shutdowns, or logistics delays can constrain Apple’s product supply. In late 2022, for example, COVID outbreaks in China temporarily reduced iPhone 14 Pro production. Geopolitical issues (trade disputes, tariffs) are another short-term risk – Apple’s products often face import tariffs and regulatory scrutiny in various countries. Apple also experiences seasonal demand swings, with the holiday quarter (Oct–Dec) being its biggest – any hiccup in a new product launch or holiday consumer spending (e.g. due to high inflation) can affect that crucial quarter’s performance. Finally, competition remains intense in the short run: rivals like Samsung, and Chinese brands in smartphones, often price aggressively or launch competing flagship devices, which can pressure Apple’s sales in certain markets.

Long-Term / Structural Risks: Over the longer horizon, Apple faces strategic challenges that could permanently impact its business. One major risk is market saturation in its core categories. The global smartphone market is mature and has been flat-to-declining in unit terms – with over 1 billion iPhone users already, Apple’s future growth in iPhones depends on replacement cycles and gaining switchers, as most addressable consumers already own a smartphone. A related risk is a lack of another revolutionary product category: Apple has not introduced a totally new high-volume product line since the Apple Watch in 2015. It is investing in AR/VR (e.g. Apple Vision Pro headset) and autonomous cars, but it’s uncertain if these will be “the next iPhone” in scale. Regulatory and political risks are also significant long-term threats. Around 19% of Apple’s revenue comes from Greater China , and Apple relies heavily on China for manufacturing. U.S.–China geopolitical tensions or Chinese government actions (e.g. restrictions on iPhone use by government officials, as occurred in 2023) could hurt Apple’s sales or supply chain. Globally, antitrust regulators are scrutinizing Apple’s App Store policies and ecosystem control – the EU’s Digital Markets Act will force some changes like allowing third-party app stores by 2024, potentially impacting the Services revenue stream. Antitrust investigations (in the U.S., EU, India, etc.) into App Store fees or preinstalled apps could eventually impose fines or require business model changes. Moreover, shifts in consumer technology preferences pose a risk: for example, if cloud-based or AI-driven platforms reduce the importance of hardware, or if a competitor creates a breakthrough device or ecosystem (e.g. a compelling Android alternative or wearable). Apple must also maintain its pace of innovation – a failure to innovate could erode its brand premium. Cybersecurity and privacy issues are another concern; a serious data breach or exploit of Apple’s systems could damage its trusted image. In summary, while Apple’s near-term challenges are largely economic and logistical, its long-term risks center on technological disruption, market saturation, and regulatory changes that could alter the industry structure .

Cost Structure#

Apple’s cost structure combines very large variable costs associated with product manufacturing and relatively smaller (but growing) fixed costs for R&D, marketing, and corporate operations. Here’s an overview:

Cost of Goods Sold (Variable Costs): The largest cost line for Apple is the cost of sales for products, which are variable costs that scale with unit production. In FY2025, Apple’s total cost of sales was $220.96 billion (53.1% of revenue). These costs include components (semiconductors, displays, memory, etc.), assembly/labor (Apple outsources production primarily to contract manufacturers in Asia), logistics, and distribution. For hardware like the iPhone, components (from suppliers like TSMC, Samsung, Sony, etc.) are a major part of unit cost. Apple’s gross margin of ~47% in 2025 implies a roughly 53% cost-of-goods percentage. The bill of materials for an iPhone 17 Pro (for example) might be around $500–$600, which Apple then sells for ~$999+, yielding a ~40% product gross margin. Apple benefits from enormous scale in procurement – it can negotiate favorable prices on components (but is also exposed to commodity price swings and supply shortages). Manufacturing is mostly variable: Apple can adjust production volumes relatively quickly (within limits) based on demand. Another variable cost is Apple’s services cost of sales (like licensing fees, payment processing, streaming content costs), but services have much higher margins (cost ~$26.8B on $109B services revenue in 2025, ~25% cost ratio).

Operating Expenses (Fixed/Semi-fixed Costs): Apple’s operating expenses consist primarily of R&D and SG&A, which are more fixed in nature. In FY2025, Research & Development expense was $34.55 billion (about 8.3% of sales) , up from $31.4B in 2024. R&D has grown substantially (for perspective, it was $8.1B in 2015, so Apple’s R&D spend quadrupled in a decade). This reflects heavy investment in new technologies (Apple designs its own chips, develops AR/VR, autonomous systems, etc.). R&D is largely a fixed cost (engineers, labs) that Apple maintains through economic cycles – it tends not to cut R&D even in weaker sales years. Selling, General & Administrative (SG&A) expense was $27.60 billion in 2025 . This includes marketing, advertising, retail store operations, and administrative overhead. Apple operates hundreds of Apple Stores globally – retail staffing and store leases are a significant fixed cost. Advertising and marketing are also significant: Apple spent an estimated $6 billion on advertising in 2022 , and total SG&A has been rising modestly (SG&A was ~$14.3B in 2015, so it has roughly doubled in 10 years). Many SG&A costs (like an ad campaign or product launch event) are discretionary but generally do not fluctuate directly with each unit sold, making them semi-fixed.

Cost Per Unit & Scalability: Apple’s gross profit per device is high – for instance, an iPhone with a $1,000 ASP might cost ~$400–$500 to make, yielding ~$500–$600 gross profit each. Apple’s economies of scale allow it to achieve lower per-unit costs: manufacturing overhead is spread over huge volumes (Apple sold ~225M iPhones in 2022 by estimates). The company’s sheer purchasing volume drives component discounts. Moreover, Apple’s services segment scales extremely well – digital content distribution has low marginal cost, so adding an extra Apple Music subscriber or App Store transaction has very little incremental cost, boosting margins.

Most Significant Costs & Trends: The most significant cost category for Apple is definitely the cost of goods for its hardware (components and manufacturing). In FY2025, product cost of sales was $194.1B, dwarfing any other expense. Within operating expenses, R&D has become very significant – Apple is spending heavily to maintain its technology lead. Notably, Apple’s R&D-to-sales ratio has climbed from ~3% a decade ago to over 8% now, indicating a strategic choice to invest in future products even as the company grew. Another big cost item is labor – Apple has ~150,000 employees worldwide . While many are in Apple Stores or operations, a growing number are highly paid engineers. The company’s wage and benefit costs have risen as it competes for talent (especially in Silicon Valley). Marketing costs, while smaller than R&D, are crucial for Apple due to its emphasis on brand – advertising spend has been estimated around $1–$2 billion annually in earlier years, and perhaps higher now (including memorable campaigns and large product launch events) . Over time, Apple’s cost structure has shown resilience: gross margin improved to ~47% recently (a 10-year high ) thanks to the growing mix of Services (which carry ~70%+ gross margins) and efficiencies in the supply chain . In recessionary periods, Apple can adjust some costs – for example, it slowed hiring and cut travel and marketing spending in 2020 during COVID. However, certain costs like R&D were not reduced. If economic conditions weaken, Apple tends to protect its margins via pricing power and supplier negotiations, rather than drastic cost-cutting, due to its focus on long-term innovation.

In summary, Apple’s cost structure is characterized by high variable costs tied to hardware production (which it manages through scale and supply chain control) and steadily rising fixed costs in R&D and other areas to fuel innovation and support its premium brand. The company’s strong gross margins and huge cash flows indicate it has managed costs well, even as it invests heavily for the future.

Management & Governance#

Current Executive Team: Apple’s leadership is regarded as one of the most effective in tech. The company is led by Tim Cook (CEO), who has been with Apple since 1998 and became CEO in 2011 (succeeding co-founder Steve Jobs). Cook is known for his expertise in operations and supply chain management, which has been crucial to Apple’s efficiency. The CFO is Luca Maestri, overseeing Apple’s finances since 2014; under his financial stewardship, Apple has executed massive capital returns while maintaining stability. Other key executives include Jeff Williams (COO), often seen as second-in-command, who handles global operations and Apple Watch development, and Eddy Cue (SVP of Services)who runs the Services division (App Store, media content) – a critical growth area for Apple. Craig Federighi (SVP of Software Engineering) oversees iOS, macOS and Apple’s software vision, while John Ternus (SVP of Hardware Engineering) leads hardware development (having taken over after longtime hardware chief Jony Ive’s 2019 departure). Overall, Apple’s executive team is a mix of Apple veterans who have decades at the company. Notably, many top leaders (Cook, Williams, Cue, Federighi) have 15+ years at Apple, providing continuity.

Board of Directors: Apple’s Board is composed of accomplished individuals from diverse industries, ensuring strong corporate governance. The Chairman of the Board is Arthur D. Levinson, former CEO of Genentech, who has served on Apple’s board since 2000 . Other independent directors include Wanda Austin, aerospace industry veteran; James Bell (former Boeing CFO) – though Bell and longtime director Al Gore retired in early 2024 upon reaching Apple’s retirement age . They were succeeded by Alex Gorsky (former Johnson & Johnson CEO) and Dr. Monica Lozano(media executive), who bring expertise in healthcare and public policy. The board also includes Ronald Sugar (former Northrop Grumman CEO), Andrea Jung (former Avon CEO), Susan Wagner (co-founder of BlackRock), and of course Tim Cook himself . This board mix provides oversight in technology, finance, marketing, and operations. The board has generally been stable, with low turnover – most directors have served for many years, guiding Apple through its growth. There is no immediate family of founders on the board (Steve Jobs’ family is not involved in management or board), but the directors and executives collectively maintain Apple’s founding ethos of innovation.

Historical Leadership & Culture: Apple’s management culture was indelibly shaped by co-founder Steve Jobs, who led the company’s renaissance from 1997 until his death in 2011. Jobs’ product-focused, perfectionist ethos persists at Apple, though Tim Cook’s style is more operational and collaborative. Many of Apple’s current senior executives were groomed under Jobs (Cue, Schiller, Ive (former), etc.), providing a sense of continuity. Over the past decade, Apple has seen a smooth leadership transition – when Jobs passed, concerns existed about whether Apple could sustain innovation, but Cook and team have delivered continuous improvements (e.g. Apple Silicon chips, expansion of Services). Some historical executives besides Jobs also made a mark: early designer Jony Ive drove Apple’s design language for decades (he left in 2019). Overall, Apple’s leadership bench has depth, and there’s a focus on internal promotion which preserves institutional knowledge.

Management Performance & Integrity: Apple’s management is generally seen as highly competent and execution-focused. Tim Cook has a track record of delivering on targets – during his tenure, Apple’s revenues and profits hit record highs and the company’s market cap grew from ~$350B to ~$2.5T+. Management tends to set realistic guidance and meet or exceed it. For example, Apple delivered on its goal to double Services revenue from 2016 to 2020. There have been few instances of Apple missing expectations; one notable instance was Q1 2019 when Apple issued a rare revenue warning due to weaker iPhone demand in China – but Cook addressed it transparently and took corrective actions. In general, Apple’s execs do not hide problems from investors: they candidly discuss challenges like currency impacts or supply constraints on earnings calls. Tim Cook’s demeanor with analysts is regarded as honest if somewhat guarded – he often reiterates Apple’s long-term view and avoids commenting on rumors, but he answers questions on operational matters clearly. The management team has also been proactive in returning cash to shareholders (a promise they’ve kept by massive buybacks/dividends) and in disclosing metrics like active devices to provide transparency on business health. Importantly, Apple’s culture emphasizes ethics and compliance – there have been no major financial scandals or management integrity issues in recent memory. Some critics have pointed to Apple’s handling of the iPhone battery slowdown in 2017 (Apple quietly throttled performance on older iPhones to prevent shutdowns) as a transparency lapse – Apple apologized and offered discounted battery replacements . But this was more a product decision issue than a financial misrepresentation. Broadly, Apple’s management enjoys a strong reputation for integrity. No significant allegations of fraud or misconduct have been levied against top executives, and the company is known for conservative accounting (e.g. not recognizing revenue until device activation historically).

Tenure and Stability: Tim Cook has now been CEO for 15 years (with Apple for ~25 years total), and other key execs have similarly long tenures, which provides stability. The management team’s longevity suggests they work well together and are committed to Apple. There is little executive turnover – when there have been changes (like retail chief Angela Ahrendts departing in 2019), transitions are orderly. This continuity has likely contributed to consistent execution.

Alignment & Insider Ownership: Apple’s executives are incentivized heavily through stock, aligning their interests with shareholders. For instance, Tim Cook’s compensation is largely in equity grants that vest over time and depend on Apple’s performance. Cook reportedly holds around 3 million Apple shares (worth ~$750M at current prices) and has periodically stated he plans to donate his wealth, but in the meantime, his net worth is tied to Apple’s stock . Other top execs also hold substantial stock and routinely receive new restricted stock unit (RSU) awards that vest over several years, encouraging them to focus on long-term stock performance. Insiders (executives and directors) collectively own a small fraction of Apple (around 0.12% as of recent data) – this is not huge given Apple’s size, but in absolute terms it’s significant wealth. The largest individual shareholder on the board is Chairman Art Levinson with ~4.5 million shares . There’s no indication of insiders aggressively selling beyond scheduled diversification; in fact, Apple’s insiders have generally held onto their granted shares, indicating confidence. CEO Tim Cook has occasionally sold shares as part of routine planned sales to cover taxes, but he also often forgoes immediate sale of vested RSUs, effectively increasing his stake. Skin in the game appears adequate – executives will “earn more from growing the business” via their stock values than from their cash salaries in most cases. One thing to note: Apple insiders rarely purchase shares on the open market (likely because most are already granted ample stock). But significantly, Apple’s aggressive share buybacks benefit insiders just as all shareholders, and insiders have supported this capital return strategy. There have been no instances of insider trading scandals or major conflicts of interest reported. Overall, Apple’s management and board’s interests are aligned with shareholders’ prosperity, primarily through stock ownership and a shared focus on Apple’s long-term success.

Shareholders & Capital Returns#

Ownership Structure: Apple is one of the most widely held stocks, with a huge institutional investor presence. As of 2025, about 62% of Apple’s shares are held by institutional investors . The largest shareholders are the big index fund houses. According to recent filings, Vanguard Group is Apple’s top shareholder, owning roughly 7.7% of shares . BlackRock is next with about 6.8%, and Berkshire Hathaway (Warren Buffett’s company) is the third-largest with about 5.8% . Other major holders include State Street (~4%), Fidelity, and various pension and sovereign wealth funds. The top 10 shareholders collectively own over one-third of Apple’s stock. Notably, these large positions by Vanguard and BlackRock are mostly in passive index funds – they hold Apple as part of S&P 500 and other index tracking. Berkshire Hathaway’s stake, however, is an active investment initiated by Buffett’s team starting in 2016; Apple now comprises roughly 45% of Berkshire’s entire stock portfolio by market value.

Shareholder Voting & Activism: Despite its size, Apple has faced relatively few activist shareholder threats – likely because its performance has been strong and its largest holders are supportive. Large institutional investors like Vanguard and BlackRock generally vote with Apple’s management on proxy proposals. For example, at the 2023 annual meeting, Apple won support for all management proposals and shareholders decisively rejected outside proposals such as a mandate to cease diversity programs (over 97% voted against that anti-DEI proposal) . This indicates that big shareholders sided with management’s stance on contentious issues. In the past, advisory shareholder proposals on topics like pay gap disclosures or environmental reports have often been voted down – big funds followed Apple’s recommendation to oppose them . However, when proposals align with broad shareholder values, big investors may break with management – e.g. in 2022, some institutional investors supported a proposal for a civil rights audit, which passed against management’s recommendation. By and large, though, Apple’s largest shareholders appear confident in management and haven’t pushed aggressive changes. There has been no major activist campaign against Apple in the past decade – partly because Apple already returns cash generously and partly because its governance (e.g. board structure) has not drawn ire. Shareholders have occasionally raised concerns (for instance, about supply chain labor practices or the App Store commission), but these have not coalesced into any serious threat to management’s control. The presence of Buffett’s Berkshire as a substantial, long-term investor also provides a strong vote of confidence in Apple’s stewardship.

Top Shareholders’ Perspectives: It’s worth noting Berkshire Hathaway’s approach: Buffett has lauded Apple as a “high-quality business” and has called Tim Cook a great manager. Berkshire initially bought Apple around 2016–2018 at an average split-adjusted price near $35–$40 , and the holding has grown to over 915 million shares (currently worth >$230 billion). Berkshire has trimmed only a small portion in 2020 (Buffett later regretted selling those shares, saying he’d increase stake if cheaper). This indicates a strong long-term commitment – Apple is seen as one of Buffett’s “forever” holdings generating massive cash. Other big shareholders like Vanguard/BlackRock mostly care that Apple remains a stable, growing component of indexes – they tend to engage on governance/environmental issues industry-wide. In Apple’s case, both firms have generally supported management; for instance, both opposed a 2022 proposal to require detailed racial equity audits (which ultimately failed to pass). Overall, the top institutional holders have executed their votes largely in alignment with Apple’s board on major issues . There has been no indication of any large shareholder agitating for a strategic change (e.g. spin-offs or drastically higher dividends). The only quasi-activist in Apple’s recent history was Carl Icahn, who in 2013–2014 took a position urging Apple to accelerate buybacks. Icahn exited in 2016 after making a sizable profit, citing concerns about China’s market for Apple. Since then, Apple’s strong buyback program has more or less placated calls for cash returns, and no activists have surfaced.

Share Buyback Program: Apple has been the most aggressive repurchaser of shares in modern corporate history. The company initiated a capital return program in 2012 and has been expanding it ever since. In each of the last several years, Apple’s board has authorized huge buyback expansions: e.g. +$90 billion in 2021, +$90B in 2022, +$90B in 2023, and most recently +$100 billion authorized in April 2025 . To date, Apple has spent over $500 billion on share repurchases since 2012 – more than any other U.S. company (for context, that’s more than the current market cap of Visa or JP Morgan). In the past 10 years, Apple reduced its split-adjusted share count from ~25 billion in 2012 to about 14.77 billion shares outstanding as of Sept 2025 , a ~40% decrease. In just the last year (FY2025), Apple bought back ~$90.7B worth of stock, retiring roughly 2.3% of shares . Over the previous 10 years, Apple’s share count fell every year as buybacks outpaced any stock issuance for employee compensation. The chart below illustrates Apple’s share repurchase trend over the decade, highlighting authorizations and spending per year (e.g. a $100B authorization in 2018 that was then executed over subsequent years ):

• 2015: $36 billion buybacks
• 2016: $30 B
• 2017: $33 B
• 2018: $73 B (boosted by repatriation of cash)
• 2019: $67 B
• 2020: $72 B
• 2021: $86 B
• 2022: ~$90 B
• 2023: ~$89 B
• 2024: $104 B (record high)
• 2025: $90.7 B

(Exact figures vary slightly by source, but Apple has consistently repurchased $70–$90B annually in recent years.)

This buyback program has been tremendously impactful: Apple’s earnings per share growth has been bolstered by the shrinking share count (e.g. net income rose ~120% 2015–2025, but EPS rose ~150+% over that period). The market generally views Apple’s buybacks positively, as they indicate management’s confidence and return excess cash. Apple still had about $56 billion remaining under its buyback authorization at Sept 2025 after accounting for recent repurchases, and it will likely continue renewing these authorizations.

Dividends: Apple also pays a dividend, though its yield is modest (~0.5–0.6% annually at recent stock prices). In 2025, Apple paid quarterly dividends of $0.24–$0.26 per share, totaling ~$15.4 billion in dividend payments for the year . Apple has raised the dividend every year since initiating it in 2012, but the increases have been small (around 5–10% per year; the current dividend per share is about $1.06 annualized). The dividend policy is conservative – Apple’s focus is clearly on buybacks for capital return (as evidenced by the magnitude). This is tax-efficient for shareholders like Berkshire Hathaway (which prefers buybacks). The dividend payout ratio is under 15% of earnings, so Apple has plenty of room to maintain and slowly grow the dividend.

Capital Return Philosophy: Management has repeatedly stated its aim is to reach a “net cash neutral” position over time – meaning Apple intends to use excess cash to buy back stock or pay dividends until its cash equals debt. As of Sept 2025, Apple had $55.7B in marketable securities (long-term) plus $35.9B cash, against $90.7B total debt . That puts net cash around $41 billion. This is down from over $120B net cash a few years ago. Clearly, Apple is gradually drawing down its huge cash hoard (which peaked at ~$285B in 2017 before repatriation taxes). The shareholder base, particularly long-term investors like Berkshire, favor this because it returns value and imposes discipline. Apple’s capital returns have had broad shareholder approval in votes and have not been controversial.

Major Shareholder Votes & Topics: At recent shareholder meetings, the most notable votes have related to social and governance issues. For example, in 2023 and 2024, proposals were brought by some shareholders regarding Apple’s App Store policies and reports on forced labor in the supply chain. These did not pass, with large institutional investors largely siding with Apple. In early 2023, shareholders voted down a proposal to scrutinize the company’s use of NDAs in employee contracts (Apple had already announced it would not enforce certain silencing clauses in cases of harassment). Also in 2023, an effort to push Apple to report on median gender/racial pay gaps was voted down ~66% to 34%. Big passive funds often follow proxy advisor recommendations; in Apple’s case, ISS and Glass Lewis have occasionally supported more disclosure proposals, but the voting power of management-aligned investors has prevailed. One notable exception: in 2022, shareholders approved a proposal for Apple to conduct a civil rights audit, against management’s wishes – large public pension funds and proxy advisors supported it. Apple complied and had a third party perform an audit. This shows that while Apple generally has shareholder backing, there is a willingness even among top holders to push Apple on environmental, social, governance (ESG) matters if needed.

In summary, Apple’s shareholder base is dominated by supportive institutional investors and a major long-term owner (Berkshire). They have benefitted from Apple’s enormous buybacks and have mostly voted in line with management. There is little sign of activist agitation, and capital allocation (buybacks/dividends) has been aligned with shareholder interests. The top shareholders’ stands in meetings have largely echoed Apple’s proposals, with occasional departures on certain ESG issues, but no fundamental disagreements on strategy.

10 Years Key Metrics (Table)#

Below is a table of key financial metrics for Apple over the past 10 fiscal years (2015–2025). All figures are in USD. FY2025 is the most recent year (ended Sept 27, 2025) and includes the latest Q4 results:

Table: Apple’s key financial metrics (2015–2025). 2015–2019 per-share metrics adjusted for stock splits. Market cap is as of final trading day of each year.

Sources: Revenue, net income from Apple 10-K/earnings releases . Margins and growth rates calculated. 2024 EPS adjusted excludes one-time tax. Market cap history from StockAnalysis . ROE for recent years extremely high due to shrinking equity .

This table shows Apple’s dramatic growth, particularly the surge in 2021 after the 5G iPhone 12 launch (33% revenue growth and 65% earnings growth) and the steady increase in profitability metrics (gross margin rising into the mid-40s% by 2024–25). We also see the effect of Apple’s massive buybacks in the EPS trend: EPS grew faster than net income (e.g. 19.5% NI growth in 2025 translated to 22.7% GAAP EPS growth). Apple’s free cash flow has been robust, averaging around $90–100B in recent years, with FCF margins above 25% at times – reflecting the company’s cash-generative business. Return on equity (ROE) has become extraordinarily high (exceeding 100% since 2021) because Apple’s equity (book value) has been whittled down by buybacks; thus, ROE is inflated and not a meaningful indicator of operating performance (Apple’s Return on Assets around 25–30% is more illustrative of its efficient profitability). Overall, Apple’s 10-year financial history shows a company that, after a brief dip in 2016, returned to growth, massively expanded its services and high-margin revenues by 2021, and has since maintained very strong profitability and shareholder returns.

Buffett‑Style Checklist#

Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett’s deep value investing criteria can be applied to Apple’s financials to assess its quality and valuation. Below, we evaluate Apple against several commonly cited “great company” standards:

1. Valuation Discipline:

• P/E ≤ 15 (vs. history): Apple’s current price-to-earnings ratio is well above 15. At the end of 2025, Apple’s trailing P/E was about 24–25x (using $7.46 EPS and ~$180 share price) . Over the past decade, Apple’s P/E has ranged from ~10x to ~30x; it was often <15 in 2016–2018 , but the market awarded a higher multiple as Apple grew services and did massive buybacks. Apple does not meet the ≤15 P/E criterion today. Its valuation is elevated relative to the deep-value benchmark, implying growth expectations from investors.
• PEG Ratio < 1: PEG ratio is P/E divided by earnings growth rate. Using Apple’s 5-year EPS CAGR (~10%) or expected future growth ~8%, and a P/E ~25, Apple’s PEG is roughly 2.5–3.0. Even using a one-year jump like FY2021, the PEG wouldn’t drop below 1. Thus, Apple fails the PEG < 1 test – its stock price embeds higher multiples than its earnings growth alone would justify under this rule of thumb.
• P/B ≤ 1.5: Apple’s price-to-book is extremely high. At FY2025’s end, Apple’s book value per share was about $4.99 . With the stock around $180–$190, P/B is ~36x. In fact, Apple’s total equity is only ~$73.7B versus a $2.7T market cap, yielding P/B ~50+. This is far above 1.5. (Apple’s aggressive share repurchases have shrunk book value; in early 2024, Apple’s shareholder equity dipped below $60B , making P/B > 60×). Clearly, Apple fails the ≤1.5 P/B criterion by a wide margin. Traditional value investors might even be cautious that Apple’s equity is so low relative to its market value (though this is due to capital returns, not operational losses).
• Margin of Safety (Price ≥25% below intrinsic value): Determining Apple’s intrinsic value requires assumptions. A conservative DCF (see next section) might put Apple’s intrinsic value around $130–$150 per share for modest growth scenarios. The stock recently trades around $170–$180, which is above that conservative intrinsic value range – i.e. no 25% discount available. By Graham’s standard of a margin of safety, Apple’s stock does not offer ≥25% discount to a prudent intrinsic value estimate. In fact, Apple appears fully valued or slightly overvalued in many analysts’ DCFs given its premium P/E and slowing growth.

2. Cash Generation & Allocation:

• Positive FCF each year & FCF/Revenue > 5%: Apple easily passes this. It has generated positive free cash flow every year in the last decade, even during downturns. Its FCF margin is very high – roughly 20–28% of revenue in each of the last 10 years . For example, in FY2025 FCF was ~$98.8B, which is ~23.7% of revenue . Even in its lowest recent year (FY2019), FCF ~$59B was ~22.6% of sales. So Apple far exceeds the >5% FCF/Revenue threshold. Pass.
• Return on Retained Earnings ≥ 12%: Buffett sometimes measures how effectively a company uses retained earnings by comparing cumulative retained profit to market value created or earnings growth. Apple’s case is unusual because it hasn’t retained earnings – it has returned more than 100% of earnings via buybacks/dividends (so retained earnings went negative by 2024) . Traditional RORE calculation is tricky here, but effectively Apple’s retained earnings have been used to repurchase stock, which certainly yielded >12% annual return for shareholders (Apple’s stock rose far more). Another approach: Apple’s earnings per share grew from $1.98 in 2015 to $7.46 in 2025, a ~14% CAGR, while paying out most earnings – which implies that what little was “retained” (or rather, the buyback leverage) generated high returns. Given the intent of the metric – to see if retained capital yields >12% more earnings – Apple’s EPS growth plus dividends have indeed exceeded 12% annualized from 2015–2025. Qualitatively, Apple passes this test (management has allocated capital very effectively). However, the mechanical RORE formula can’t be applied straight when retained earnings are negative. The spirit of the criterion – efficient use of earnings – is fulfilled by Apple’s buybacks which boosted EPS growth impressively.

3. Growth & Predictability:

• EPS Record: Positive & rising each year for 10 yrs: Apple’s EPS has been positive every year, but it has not risen every single year. EPS dipped in 2016 (down from 2015’s peak) and again slightly in 2019 and 2023. For example, EPS went from $1.98 (2015) down to ~$1.68 (2016) , and $6.15 (2022) down to ~$5.89 (2023). Thus, Apple fails the “every year up” test. It had 3 down years in the past decade. However, the general trajectory is strongly upward – EPS roughly quadrupled over 10 years – but strict Graham/Buffett criteria want consistency. Apple’s earnings are a bit cyclical with product supercycles. Technically fails perfect consistency.
• Book Value per Share 10yr CAGR ≥ 10%, no years of decline: Apple fails this completely. Its book value per share has actually declined in recent years due to massive share buybacks outpacing retained profits. Apple’s BVPS was about $20 (split-adjusted) in 2014 and is under $5 now . It has decreased in most of the last few years. Traditional value investors might view the shrinking equity with caution (though in Apple’s case it’s intentional). So, Apple does not meet a criterion of growing shareholder equity annually; instead, equity has contracted as cash was returned. This is a fail under the classic rule (which expects a company to be reinvesting and compounding equity – Apple has chosen to distribute capital, not retain it).
• Owner’s Earnings positive every year, OE/Market Cap ≥ 10%: “Owner’s earnings” (Buffett’s term) approximates free cash flow. Apple’s owner’s earnings (net income + depreciation – capex, roughly) have been positive every year – no issue there. However, OE/Market Cap ≥ 10% is a high bar (essentially a 10% earnings yield). Apple’s FCF yield currently is around 3.5% (with ~$100B FCF on a ~$2.8T market cap). Even at the lows of 2022, its FCF yield was ~5%. It has never been close to 10% in the last decade except perhaps around 2013. So Apple fails the ≥10% OE/MarketCap standard – its stock is priced richly, giving a low earnings yield. Deep value investors would consider Apple too expensive by this metric.

4. Balance-Sheet Safety:

• Debt-to-Equity < 0.5: Apple’s debt/equity ratio is well above 0.5 in recent years. At FY2025, Apple had $90.7B of total debt vs $73.7B equity , giving D/E ≈1.23. In fact, since 2018 Apple’s D/E has been >1 as equity shrank. Back in 2015, Apple had D/E ~0.45 (debt $64B vs eq $119B) , but it levered up in late 2010s to fund buybacks (taking advantage of low interest rates). While Apple’s absolute debt is large ($90B), it’s easily covered by Apple’s $132B in cash & investments (Apple effectively has net cash, not net debt). However, on the strict ratio, Apple fails D/E <0.5 now. Its balance sheet, though strong in liquidity, doesn’t meet that conservative threshold due to capital returns.
• Interest Coverage ≥ 3×: Apple easily passes this. Its EBIT is enormous relative to interest. In FY2025, Apple’s operating income was $133B and even if we take earnings before interest (~$132.7B pre-tax) vs interest expense of only ~$2.6B (estimated from net OI&E), coverage is around 50×. Even in worst cases, Apple’s interest coverage has been >20×. Pass.
• Interest Expense / Operating Income ≤ 15%: As noted, Apple’s interest burden is minimal. In 2025, interest expense was roughly $2B (net other expense was only $321M after interest income). That is about 1.5% of operating income – extremely low. Apple’s interest expense has never approached 15% of operating profits; it’s been under 5% historically. Pass.
• Current Ratio > 1.5: Apple’s current ratio is <1 typically, which is unusual but stems from its efficient working capital management. At Sept 2025, current assets were $147.96B vs current liabilities $165.63B, giving a current ratio ~0.89 . Apple has had current ratio around 1.0 or below for many years (e.g. 0.8 in 2022). This fails the >1.5 conservative criterion. However, Apple’s negative working capital is by design – it gets paid upfront by customers and pays suppliers later (high accounts payable), a sign of strength in supply chain terms. Apple also holds huge long-term marketable securities that could be converted if needed. Traditional analysis would flag a sub-1 current ratio as a potential liquidity risk, but in Apple’s case its strong cash generation and net cash position mitigate that. Strictly though, Apple fails the >1.5 current ratio test.

5. Profitability & Efficiency:

• Gross Margin ≳ 40%: Apple’s gross margin in recent years has been above 40%. In FY2025 it was 46.9% – a record high. Over the past decade, gross margin ranged ~37–44%, dipping to ~38% in 2016–2019 but rising since. It’s now comfortably above 40%. Pass. Apple’s blended margin benefits from higher-margin services.
• Net Profit Margin ≳ 20%: Apple consistently posts net margins above 20%. Even in its worst year (2019) it was ~21%. Recently it’s ~25–27%. FY2025 net margin was 26.9% . Apple far exceeds the 20% benchmark. Pass.
• ROE ≥ 15% (10yr avg): Apple’s return on equity has been way above 15% every year (because equity is small). Even adjusting for capital structure, Apple’s ROE averaged well over 30% in the mid-2010s and exploded to >100% in last few years . The 10-year average ROE is not meaningful given the distortion, but certainly >15%. Pass. (However, a value investor might note that such high ROE is not due to extraordinary operational efficiency alone but also due to financial engineering reducing equity).
• ROIC ≥ 12% (10yr avg): Apple’s return on invested capital is excellent. Excluding cash, Apple’s ROIC has been ~20–50% annually in the past decade . For example, Finbox estimates Apple’s ROIC averaged ~53.5% from 2021–2025 . Even more stringent definitions yield ~40–50% ROIC recently . In the earlier 2010s, ROIC was lower but still likely above 12%. Pass. Apple’s core business generates far more than a 12% return on the capital it uses (its operating margins and asset turnover are high, and it has more cash than debt).
• ROA ≥ 6%: Apple’s return on assets has been well above 6% every year. It ranged ~14–18% in 2015–2019, dipped in 2016 with lower income, but surged to ~25–30% in 2021–2022. FY2025 ROA is ~31% (112B on 359B assets). Pass. Apple clearly meets a 6% ROA hurdle by a wide margin, reflecting efficient asset use (lots of cash and strong profits).
• Depreciation / Gross Profit ≤ 10%: Apple’s depreciation is relatively low compared to gross profit, as it outsources most manufacturing. In 2025, depreciation+amortization was $11.7B vs $195.2B gross profit, which is ~6%. Historically, this ratio was around 8–10% a decade ago (2015 D&A $11.3B on $93.6B gross profit ~12% , slightly above 10% when Apple was investing in new campuses). In recent years, it’s comfortably below 10% as gross profit grew faster than capex. FY2024 was ~$11.4B on $180.7B gross profit = 6.3%. Pass. Apple’s depreciation is a small fraction of its gross earnings, indicating its business is not overly asset-heavy.

Summary: By Buffett-style “great company at fair price” criteria, Apple’s quality metrics are excellent: it passes almost all profitability and efficiency tests (huge margins, ROIC, ROA, FCF generation) and it has a fortress-like ability to cover interest. Apple’s growth record is strong but not uninterrupted (a few dips, so not 10/10 on consistency). Where Apple clearly fails is on valuation safety metrics: its stock is expensive relative to earnings and book value in classic terms. A P/E in the mid-20s and PEG well over 1 indicate the market is pricing Apple for solid growth and low risk – not a bargain basement find. Similarly, its dividend/FCF yield is far below what deep value investors seek for margin of safety. In essence, Apple is a fantastic business (high returns on capital, durable moat) but at a rich valuation, so it doesn’t meet strict value investor pricing rules. Warren Buffett himself has made an exception in viewing Apple as a “consumer franchise” he’s willing to pay up for, which he did (Berkshire’s average cost was about 12–13x earnings at time of purchase , which was a fair, not deep, value). Traditional Graham criteria would say Apple is overvalued on P/E and P/B, but its superior economics justify a premium. A value investor would likely put Apple in the “wonderful company, but buy at the right price” category – and today’s price may be above that “right price” threshold.

DCF Valuation Analysis#

To estimate Apple’s intrinsic value, we conduct a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis under three scenarios: No-Growth, Conservative, and Nominal Growth. This will help gauge a range of fair values and a corresponding margin-of-safety buy price (30% discount). All figures are in USD, and we use Apple’s Free Cash Flow (FCF) as the basis (which approximates “owner’s earnings”). Apple’s trailing 12-month FCF is about $99 billion (FY2025). We will use a 10% discount rate (roughly Apple’s cost of equity, in line with Buffett’s hurdle rate) for present value calculations.

Assumptions: Apple’s FY2025 FCF = $99B is our starting point. Apple’s long-term growth is uncertain, so we examine: (1) zero growth, (2) very low growth (based on Apple’s weakest historical growth), and (3) moderate growth (based on historical average). We’ll assume Apple can sustain its current cash flows for a decade and then apply a terminal value.

• No-Growth Case: Assume 0% FCF growth going forward – Apple’s FCF stays at ~$99B each year indefinitely. This is a very conservative “no growth” scenario (essentially assuming Apple’s earnings plateau at current level, with no increase). In this case, Apple’s value can be approximated as a perpetuity of $99B at 10% discount rate.
• Calculation: PV of FCF perpetuity = FCF / r = $99B / 0.10 = $990 billion.
• Apple also has net cash of about $40 billion (cash and investments minus debt) on the balance sheet , which we add to equity value. That gives total intrinsic value ≈ $1.03 trillion.
• Divide by ~14.8B shares, intrinsic value per share ≈ $70.
• Applying a 30% margin of safety, a buy price would be about $49 or below.
• Interpretation: Under zero growth, Apple’s intrinsic value is roughly $70/share. The stock is far above that now (~$170+), implying that the market is pricing in growth (or lower discount rates) that this scenario ignores. In other words, if Apple never grows again, the current stock is significantly overvalued. The no-growth scenario is extremely conservative since Apple is likely to grow at least modestly (or at least adjust costs to maintain earnings). It basically provides a floor value assuming Apple’s current cash flows stay flat forever.
• Conservative Case (Low Growth): Use Apple’s lowest sustainable FCF growth rate observed in the past or anticipated. Historically, Apple had some years of declining FCF (e.g. –8% in FY2023), but let’s assume Apple can grow at a minimal 2% per year (roughly equal to inflation, essentially very low real growth). This 2% might reflect scenarios of saturation and only pricing power or services offsetting hardware declines – a conservative forward outlook.
• Projection: $99B starting FCF grows at 2% annually for say 10 years, then we compute a terminal value at year 10 with 0% growth thereafter (to stay conservative in terminal). We can approximate via the Gordon Growth formula directly with g=2% into perpetuity, since 2% is small relative to discount rate.
• Terminal (perpetuity with growth) value at present = FCF * (1+g) / (r – g) = $99B * 1.02 / (0.10 – 0.02) = $99B * 1.02 / 0.08 = $1.261 trillion. (Alternatively, do 10-year PV of growing annuity plus term value – but result will be similar because a growing perpetuity formula accounts for it, as long as starting at t=0.)
• Add net cash $40B, total intrinsic equity ≈ $1.301 trillion.
• Per share value ≈ $88.
• 30% margin of safety implies buy at ~$62 or lower.
• In this scenario, Apple’s fair value is about $88/share, which is still well below the current market price. This suggests that if Apple only grows at ~2% (near its slowest rate historically for any multi-year period), the stock is overpriced at ~$170 – it would need to nearly halve to offer a margin of safety. Many value investors might indeed argue Apple’s future growth could be low (given its size), so this scenario shows the caution: Apple’s current price assumes more than minimal growth.
• Nominal Case (Average Growth): Assume Apple’s FCF grows at approximately its average rate of the past decade. Apple’s 10-year FCF CAGR (2015–2025) was around 5–6% (despite big jumps and dips). However, excluding the extraordinary 2021 jump, a reasonable average forward growth might be in the 5–8% range annually (Apple’s services can grow double-digits, but iPhone might be low single-digits, so blended mid-single-digit). We’ll pick 8% as a nominal case – somewhat optimistic but aligns with many analysts expecting high-single-digit EPS growth long-term (also roughly equal to global nominal GDP growth, which Apple could match given pricing power and share buybacks).
• Projection: Treating it as a growing perpetuity at 8% (though caution: 8% perpetual growth is unsustainable forever – we implicitly assume high growth for maybe 5–10 years then it would taper, but to simplify we’ll use a single-stage approximation which likely overstates value because 8% forever > global economy growth). Nonetheless:
• Value = $99B * 1.08 / (0.10 – 0.08) = $99B * 1.08 / 0.02 = $5.346 trillion.
• Add $40B net cash = ~$5.386T, per share ≈ $364.
• Margin-of-safety 70% of that = ~$255 buy target.
• This nominal scenario indicates that if Apple can continue ~8% FCF growth for a very long time, its intrinsic value might be in the mid-$300s per share – which is above today’s price, suggesting upside. However, an 8% perpetual growth is a strong assumption; more realistically, a two-stage DCF might model 8% for 5 years then drop to perhaps 3% terminal. If we did that: say $99B grows 8% for 5 years to ~$146B, then assume 3% perpetuity from year 6 onward. The PV of first 5 years’ cash flows (at 10%) plus terminal value (at year 5, TV = $146B * (1.03)/(0.10-0.03) discounted back) would yield an intrinsic value more around $2.5–$3 trillion, or ~$170–200 per share. That more nuanced result actually aligns closer to current market price. So the $364 from a naive one-stage 8% is likely an overestimation.
• Nonetheless, the simplified nominal case shows Apple’s valuation is very sensitive to growth assumptions. At 0–2% growth, it looked overpriced; at ~8% sustained growth, it could be somewhat undervalued. The truth is probably in between. Many analysts might forecast ~5% long-term FCF growth; plugging that would give intrinsic value around $150–$180/share (roughly $2.5T market cap), which is near current levels – meaning Apple is fairly valued assuming mid-single-digit growth.

DCF Results Summary:

• No Growth (0%): Intrinsic value ≈ $70/share, suggesting a $49 buy target (30% MOS).
• Low Growth (2%): Intrinsic value ≈ $88/share, buy target ≈ $62.
• Nominal Growth (Avg ~5–8%; we used 8% for illustration): Intrinsic value could range $150–$360 depending on horizon. At ~8% perpetuity, we got $364, implying current price has margin of safety. But realistically, for 8% over a finite period then slowing, intrinsic is likely around $170±. A 30% MOS on a $170 intrinsic would be **$119**.

Given Apple’s current stock $170–$180, the market is pricing in moderate growth. Under conservative assumptions, Apple looks overvalued; only under aggressive growth does it look cheap. In practice, Apple’s strong brand and ecosystem may allow it to keep growing (services, new products) at a mid-single digit rate or better for some time. Many Buffett-style investors might thus hold Apple despite a high P/E, viewing it as a unique franchise. But if one strictly requires a 30% margin of safety relative to conservative intrinsic value ($88/share), one would wait for a much lower price.

Key DCF Takeaway: Apple’s intrinsic value range is broad. With zero growth, it’s around $1T (far below the market cap). With modest growth, maybe ~$2.5T (close to market). With high growth optimism, even $3T+ could be justified. This highlights that Apple at current prices leaves little margin of safety for value investors – it’s priced for continued success. If one demands a MOS, they’d likely wait for a significant dip. For instance, during the 2022 market downturn, Apple briefly traded at ~$125 (which would have been near that $119 MOS target for a fair value ~$170). In summary, Apple fails a strict “buy at 70% of intrinsic” test at present – it’s a phenomenal business, but not on sale by classic DCF standards.

(Note: DCF figures are rough and assume a steady-state scenario. Actual valuation would refine growth periods and terminal rates. We also assume Apple’s 10% discount; some might argue for lower given Apple’s stability, which would raise intrinsic values.)

Key Metrics Charts#

Below are a series of charts illustrating Apple’s 10-year trends for important metrics, with averages and highs/lows noted:

Chart 1: Market Price (Year-End) – Apple’s stock price has risen dramatically, especially after 2019. The red dashed line is the 10-year average price. Max (2025: $271.86) and min (2018: $39.44) are annotated.

Chart 2: Book Value Per Share – Book value/share declined due to buybacks (falling from ~$20 in 2015 to ~$5 in 2025). Apple’s equity per share peaked in 2015 and has since dropped steadily (negative retained earnings). The average (red line) and the sharp decline highlight Apple’s return of capital instead of balance sheet growth.

(Charts continued on next page…)

(The report continues with additional charts for P/E, P/B, Market Cap, Assets, Liabilities, Cash, Revenue & growth, Margins, Profits, FCF, CapEx, ROE/ROA/ROIC, etc., each with 10-year trendlines and key points annotated, following the Basic Black theme.)

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Disclaimer (再声明): This content only expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. All financial data and analysis are based on publicly available sources and may be subject to revisions or differing interpretations. The content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. You should conduct your own due diligence with a licensed financial advisor before making investment decisions. The author has no duty or obligation to update the information herein. Further, no representation is made that past investment performance is indicative of future results. Wherever there is potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This content is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. This report is not an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities in any jurisdiction.

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